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Abstract
Consider an agent facing a risky distribution of losses who can change this distribution by exerting some effort.
Should he exert more effort when he becomes more risk-averse? For instance, should we expect more risk-averse
drivers to drive more cautiously? In this article, we give sufﬁcient conditions under which the answer is positive,
using results presented in Jewitt (1989). We ﬁrst extend the standard models of self-insurance and self-protection
andshowthatthecomparativestaticsdependsonlyontheeffectofeffortonthenetloss. Wethenpresentconditions
for the continuous case with applications.
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1. Introduction
Consider an agent who faces the risk of a monetary loss and who can choose the level of
a preventing activity (hereafter “effort”) so as to modify this distribution. One can think
for instance of an incompletely insured car owner who may drive more or less cautiously.
The study of the effect of increased risk-aversion on the level of effort is generally based on
the classical distinction proposed by Ehrlich and Becker [1972] between self-insurance
and self-protection. Self-insurance designates an effort aiming at loss reduction, for a
given probability of loss; while self-protection applies to an effort aimed at reducing the
probability of a given loss. It is now well-known (see Dionne and Eeckhoudt [1985] and
Briys and Schlesinger [1990] that while more risk-averse agents always choose a higher
level of self-insurance, it is not necessarily the case for self-protection.
In this article, we revisit this distinction using general single-crossing conditions pre-
sented in Jewitt [1989]. In Section 2, we ﬁrst propose a more general model that encom-
passes both self-insurance and self-protection, and signiﬁcantly extends previous results.
Effort is shown to increase with risk-aversion if conditional on the occurrence of a loss,
effort is a desirable good, irrespective of the impact of effort on the probability of loss. This
conditioninfactseemstobethemaindifferencebetweenself-insuranceandself-protection.
Indeed, if it does not hold, then increasing risk-aversion a priori leads to ambiguous effects
on the level of effort. However, we are also able to prove in Section 3 that self-protection20 BRUNO JULLIEN, BERNARD SALANI´ E AND FRANC ¸OIS SALANI´ E
increases with risk-aversion if and only if the initial probability of loss is low enough (see
Dionne, Eeckhoudt, and Godfroid [1998] for a related result).
The results above apply in a model where conditional on effort, the level of losses is
deterministic. In Section 4, we examine the general case in which the distribution of wealth
depends on effort. We there exhibit a simple sufﬁcient condition for effort to increase with
risk-aversion. This condition appears to be satisﬁed in the most usual models, as shown by
illustrative examples. We show in particular that the comparative statics of coinsurance and
of franchise contracts is independent of the premium function. We conclude by providing a
simple proof of the link between the single-crossing condition and the comparative statics.
2. Self-insurance
Consider an agent with an increasing Von-Neuman-Morgenstern utility function U. This
agent faces a risk of loss (or accident) and can engage in effort, chosen from an interval
[0; N e]. For a level e of effort, his wealth is w D W ¡ c.e/ with probability .1 ¡ p.e/) and
w D W ¡ d.e/ with probability p.e/. The function c.e/ can be thought of as the cost of
effort. The differencel.e/ D d.e/¡c.e/is theloss, and W isthe initialwealth. We assume
that effort is costly and that the loss is positive:
C0: c.e/ is nondecreasing; and l.e/>0.
Thus the expected utility of the agent is
p.e/U.W ¡ d.e// C .1 ¡ p.e//U.W ¡ c.e//:
Note that this model encompasses the traditional models of both self-insurance (for which
p.e/´ p;c is increasing, and d is decreasing)1 and self-protection (p is decreasing, c is
increasing, and d.e/ D c.e/ C l with l > 0).
We are interested in whether a more risk-averse agent, whose utility function V is an in-
creasing concave transformation of U, will choose a higher level of effort. Denote F.w;e/
thecdfofwealthgiveneffort. Jewitt[1989]givesthefollowingminimalsufﬁcientcondition
for this monotone comparative statics property to hold:2
Single-crossing condition: For all e1 <e2; F.w;e1/ ¡ F.w;e2/ changes sign at most
once, from nonnegative to nonpositive, when w increases.
Jewitt’s condition relies on earlier results by Hammond [1974] and Diamond and Stiglitz
[1974]. We give a simple, self-contained proof for the sufﬁciency of this condition in the
last section.
Intuitively,theeffectofeffortmustbetodecreaserisk(inthesenseofﬁrst-orderstochastic
dominance) in the lower tail of the distribution of wealth at the cost of an increase in risk
in the upper tail. Applying this to our context leads to:
Proposition 1: Assume that C0 holds and that d.e/ is nonincreasing. If e1 <e2 and U
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Proof. For a level of effort e, the cdf of wealth is 0 if w<W ¡d.e/, p.e/ if W ¡d.e/<
w<W ¡ c.e/,a n d1i fw>W ¡ c.e/.
For two levels e1 <e2, the assumptions on c and d imply that ¡d.e1/·¡ d.e2/ ·
¡c.e2/ ·¡ c.e1/, so that




p.e1/ ¸ 0i f W ¡ d.e1/<w<W ¡ d.e2/
p.e1/ ¡ p.e2/ if W ¡ d.e2/<w<W ¡ c.e2/
p.e1/ ¡ 1 · 0i f W ¡ c.e2/<w<W ¡ c.e1/
and 0 elsewhere. Thus the property quoted in the text is veriﬁed, whatever the sign of
.p.e1/ ¡ p.e2//. 2
As a consequence, a more risk-averse agent must choose a higher level of effort, the
reason for this being simply that a higher effort increases the worst outcome. Indeed our
result is independent of whether the probability increases or decreases with e; neither does
it require that the agent be risk-averse. Thus this proposition signiﬁcantly extends previous
resultsintheliteratureonself-insurance,whichisthespecialcaseinwhich p.e/isconstant.
Another generalization of earlier results on self-insurance obtains when assuming that
the probability of loss is constant .p.e/ D p 2 .0;1/). Let us add risks on ﬁnal wealth, so
that the expected utility of the agent is
pE[U.w1/ j e] C .1 ¡ p/E[U.w0/ j e];
where w0 and w1 are stochastic variables whose distribution may depend on e (indeed they
generalize the previous terms c and d).
Proposition 2: If for all e; Prfw1 <w 0 j egD1; and for all e1 < e2;w 0 j e1 .resp.
w1 j e2/ dominates w0 j e2 .resp. w1 j e1/ in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance;
then a more risk-averse agent chooses a higher level of effort.
Proof. For i D 0;1, denote Gi.w;e/ the cdf of wi j e, which is positive on the interval
.ai.e/;bi.e//.F o r e1 < e2, G0.w j e1/ · G0.w j e2/ and G1.w j e1/ ¸ G1.w j e2/.
Therefore,
b1.e1/ · b1.e2/ · a0.e2/ · a0.e1/:
Foralevele,thecdf F.w;e/ofwealthispG1.w j e/ifw<a0.e/,and pC.1¡p/G0.w j e/




p.G1.w;e1/ ¡ G1.w;e2// ¸ 0i f w<a0.e2/
¡.1 ¡ p/G0.w;e2/ · 0i f a0.e2/<w<a0.e1/
.1 ¡ p/.G0.w;e1/ ¡ G0.w;e2// · 0i f a0.e1/<w
and the single-crossing condition is veriﬁed. 222 BRUNO JULLIEN, BERNARD SALANI´ E AND FRANC ¸OIS SALANI´ E
The assumption on supports carries the idea that the occurrence of an accident reduces
the agent’s revenue. Assuming moreover that p is a constant allows to avoid any other
assumption on the distributions w0 and w1 and yields this simple result.
Tosummarize,thissectionoffersanewcharacterizationofself-insurance: self-insurance
obtains when effort is desirable conditional on having an accident and undesirable condi-
tional on not having an accident. Under self-insurance, a more risk-averse agent chooses a
higher level of effort.
3. Self-protection
Let us now turn to the case where d.:/ is increasing—so that conditional on having an
accident, one would like to reduce effort. One important result due to Meyer (theorem 4
in Meyer [1975]) states that given e1 <e2, it is possible to ﬁnd an increasing U such
that, if U prefers e2 to e1, then so does any V more risk-averse than U. Thus a mono-
tone comparative static result would hold, provided attention is restrained to agents that
are risk-averse enough. However, this result vanishes when applied to our case because we
consider that effort is a continuous variable: therefore, for a given e2 chosen byU,w eh a v e
to discard an inﬁnite number of candidates e1 < e2 to ensure that V will indeed choose an
effort not lower than e2. The distinction between ranking two levels of effort (as discussed
by Meyer) and ﬁnding the optimal effort (as in this article) is illustrated by the following
result.
Proposition 3: Let p.e/;c.e/; and d.e/ be continuously differentiable; with c.e/ and
d.e/ increasing. AssumeU is increasing and continuously differentiable and that the agent
characterized byU strictly prefers effort e0 2]0; N e[ to any other effort; with 0 < p.e0/<1.
Then there exists more risk-averse utility functions V1 and V2 such that V1 .resp. V2/
chooses a higher .resp. lower/ level of activity than U.
Proof. Let 0 <¸<1;0 <®<inff1 ¡ p.e0/; p.e0/g.
Choose e2 < e0 close enough to e0 so that
Max
p.e/·®
E.U j e/<E.U j e2/ and (1)
E.U j e0/ ¡ E.U j e2/<¸ ® [U.W ¡ d.e2// ¡ U.W ¡ d.e0//] (2)
and deﬁne the more risk-averse utility function V2.x/ D .1 C ¸/U.x/ ¡ ¸maxfU.x/;
U.W ¡ d.e2//g.F o re ¸ e0 (assuming c.e/<d.e2/ for the comparison between e2 and e
to be nontrivial),
E.V2 j e/¡ E.V2 j e2/ D [E.U j e/¡ E.U j e2/]
¡¸p.e/[U.W ¡d.e2//¡U.W ¡d.e//]:
This is strictly negative for p.e/ · ® because of (1) and d.e2/<d.e/. It is strictly negative
for p.e/ ¸ ® because of (2), E.U j e/ · E.U j e0/ and d.e/ ¸ d.e0/. Therefore, V2
prefers e2 < e0 to any e ¸ e0.SHOULD RISK-AVERSE AGENTS EXERT MORE EFFORT? 23
The reverse case obtains by choosing e1 > e0 such that
Max
1¡p.e/·®
E.U j e/<E.U j e1/ and
E.U j e0/ ¡ E.U j e1/<¸ ® [U.W ¡ c.e0// ¡ U.W ¡ c.e1//]
and the utility function V1.x/ D .1¡¸/U.x/C¸inffU.x/;U.W ¡c.e1//g. Then a similar
argument using
E.V1 j e/ ¡ E.V1 j e1/ D [E.U j e/ ¡ E.U j e1/] ¡ ¸.1 ¡ p.e//
£[U.W ¡ c.e//¡U.W ¡ c.e1//]
shows that V1 prefers e1 to any e · e0. 2
The intuition is given graphically in Briys and Schlesinger [1990]. When d.:/ is increas-
ing, a higher level of effort would lead an agent to obtain a lower wealth when he has an
accident. But the marginal utility of wealth in case of an accident can be made arbitrarily
higher for V than for U, so that reducing effort may be optimal.
The ambiguity is illustrated by the following example. A driver must go through a cross-
road without any visibility, with the risk of a collision. Going faster through the cross-road
reduces the time of exposure and therefore the probability of collision but increases the
severity of the damage in case of accident. It is not clear whether a more risk-averse driver
prefers to reduce or to increase the speed. This illustrative example has the same structure
that the standard model of self-protection presented in Ehrlich and Becker [1972]. Indeed,
therehavebeendifﬁcultiesinprovidingcomparativestaticsresultsonriskaversionforself-
protection (see Dionne and Eeckhoudt [1985] and Briys-Schlesinger [1990]). To address
this issue, we restrict attention to risk-averse agents and assume that
C1: U is concave; c.e/ and d.e/ are increasing convex; d.e/>c.e/; p.e/ is decreasing
convex and p00.e/p.e/ ¸ 2.p0.e//2.
ConditionC1ensuresthatself-protectioncanbedesirableandalsothatthemaximization
program determining its level is concave.3
For the problem to be meaningful, we also assume that the optimal level of effort for U
is interior (this can be ensured through appropriate Inada-like conditions):
C2: The level of effort for U is strictly between 0 and N e.
Under these assumptions, the optimal level of self-protection eu for U is uniquely deter-
mined by
¡p0.eu/ D
p.eu/U0.A/d0.eu/ C .1 ¡ p.eu//U0.B/c0.eu/
U.B/ ¡ U.A/
;
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As the maximization programs are concave, the level of self-protection is larger for V
than for U if the RHS of the ﬁrst-order condition evaluated at eu is smaller for V than for










A direct computation then shows that this is the case if and only if













as B > A, so that both terms in brackets are positive. Let us deﬁne p¤ by
p¤
1 ¡ p¤ D
µ
U0.B/1V ¡ V 0.B/1U





where 0 < p¤ < 1.
As the function p=.1 ¡ p/ is increasing and maps (0, 1) into .0;1/, we obtain:
Proposition 4: Assume C1 and C2 hold for U and V; with V more risk-averse than U.
Then self-protection is higher for V than for U if and only if p.eu/<p¤.
Theintuitionisclear: foralowprobabilityofloss,themorerisk-averseagentexertsmore
effort to self-protect, as the intuition suggests. For a high probability of loss, he is mainly
interestedinreducingthemaximalloss, whichleadstolessself-protection. Asimilarresult
is obtained by Dionne et al. [1998] in an independent work, in which they restrict attention
to what they call “proper risk behavior.”
Note however that the threshold p¤ depends on bothU and V, as well as eu. We need, of
course,toshowthattheconditionisnotvacuous—thatthereexistcasesinwhich p.eu/<p¤
and cases in which p.eu/>p¤. To prove this, we note that p¤ depends on the function
p.:/ only through eu. Assume that the initial function p.:/ is replaced by a new function
q.:/ such that
¡q0.eu/ D
q.eu/U0.A/d0.eu/ C .1 ¡ q.eu//U0.B/c0.eu/
U.B/ ¡ U.A/
:
Then U still chooses the same level eu; p¤ is unchanged, and V chooses a higher level of
self-protectionifandonlyiftheinequalityq.eu/<p¤ holds. Thisshowsthatourcondition
has predictive content.SHOULD RISK-AVERSE AGENTS EXERT MORE EFFORT? 25
This result was already shown by Dionne and Eeckhoudt [1985] for the case of quadratic
utility functions when d.:/ D c.:/ C l;l > 0; then the threshold p¤ equals 1=2 and is thus
independent of the value of l. More generally, assume that l is small compared to wealth.










where Ru and Rv denote absolute risk aversion, while Pu and Pv denote absolute prudence.
We see that, whenever V is more prudent than U, p¤ will be below 1
2 for l close to zero.
As another example in which d.:/Dc.:/ C l, consider CARA utility functions with
risk-aversion indices ® for U and ¯ for V. Then a direct computation shows that
p¤
1 ¡ p¤ D
¯ ¡ ® C ®e¯l ¡ ¯e®l
.¯ ¡ ®/e®le¯l ¡ ¯e¯l C ®e®l ;
which decreases from 1 to 0 as l increases from 0 to inﬁnity. Therefore, p¤ decreases with
l from 1=2 to 0. Note that eu is always increasing with respect to l, so that p.eu) is also
decreasing, and the comparison with p¤ is ambiguous.
To conclude this section, let us consider again our model in the case when in addition
to the risk of accident, the individual faces a background risk on wealth, independent from
the occurrence of an accident. Then his expected utility is
p.e/EU. Q w ¡ d.e// C .1 ¡ p.e//EU. Q w ¡ c.e//:
Deﬁnes the new utility functions O U.x/ D EU. Q w C z/ and O V.z/ D EV. Q w C z/. Then the
comparative static exercise reduces to the above problem for utility functions O U and O V.
Pratt [1988] shows that provided that eitherU or V has a decreasing absolute risk aversion,
O V is more risk averse than O U whenever V is more risk averse than U. It follows that all the
preceding results extends to the case of background risk and DARA utility functions.
4. The general case
Nowconsiderthegeneralcaseinwhichtheﬁnalwealthwisarandomvariablewithcompact
support. The wealth distribution is characterized by a cdf F.w;e/ that depends on effort
e. The single-crossing condition ensures that a more risk-averse agent chooses a higher
level of effort. To apply it to our framework, we deﬁne l DW ¡ c.e/ ¡ w, so that l is a
random loss with cdf G.l;e/ while c.e/ is interpreted as the cost of effort (it is arbitrary,
introducedforclarityandneedsnotevenbeincreasing). Thisframeworkclearlygeneralizes
the two-states of nature model studied in the previous sections. A general result obtains as
follows:
Proposition 5: Assume l D Á.";e/; where " is a random variable whose distribution is
independent of e;Á " >0 and Á"e <0. Then a more risk-averse agent chooses a higher level
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Proof. Under our assumptions, we can write w D Ã.e;"/with Ã" < 0 and Ãe" > 0. Let
H."/ be the cdf of ".F o re2 > e1,w eh a v e
1.w/ ´ F.w;e1/ ¡ F.w;e2/ D H."2/ ¡ H."1/;
where w D Ã.e1;" 1/ D Ã.e2;" 2/. Since Ãe" > 0, "1 must decrease more slowly than "2
whenw increases. As H isnondecreasing, 1canthuschangesignonlyonce, frompositive
to negative. Therefore, the single-crossing condition applies. 2
The condition Á"e < 0 means that effort must reduce the loss in bad states of nature
(high "), at the cost of increasing it in good states of nature.4 This is exactly the property
captured by the deﬁnition for self-insurance at the end of Section 2. One simple and fairly
usual example is provided by the case where the loss is distributed around its mean with
an additive noise: l D ¹.e/ C ¾.e/". Then e increases with risk aversion if the variance
decreases with e (note that the expectation ¹.e/ does not play any role).
This example can be applied to coinsurance: interpret ¾.e/ as the uninsured share of
the risk, ¹.e/ as the associated premium, and e as the agent’s decision. Then more risk-
averse agents choose to insure a higher share of the risk. Similarly, it is easily shown
that in the (nondifferentiable) case in which l D¹.e/ C minf";l.e/g with l0.e/<0, effort
also increases with risk-aversion. This case is interesting in that self-protection reduces
the maximal loss supported by the agent; thus l.e/ can be interpreted as the deductible in
an insurance contract, and e just deﬁnes the choice of deductible: we therefore see that
more risk-averse agents should choose a lower deductible. The interesting part of these
two results is that they show that the fact that more risk-averse agents buy more insurance
doesn’t depend on the relationship between the coverage and the premium but only on the
nature of the coverage. The design of a ﬁnancial portfolio, or the choice of a production
level under risk, also offer numerous examples for which Proposition 5 allows for direct
conclusions.
In the case of a smooth distribution, we obtain
Proposition 6: If the distribution of losses is characterized by a positive density g.l;e/




Proof. Choosing " to be uniform on [0, 1], then G.Á.";e/;e/ D " so that Áe D¡
Ge
g ,
which gives the condition. 2
As g ´ Gl, the ratio ¡
Ge
g can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between
loss and self-protection at a constant level of the cumulative distribution of losses. In the
space .l;e/, the iso-cumulative curves must then be convex. This expresses a property of
decreasing returns to effort. Indeed assume that the agent is ready to bear a given proba-
bility P that the loss is higher than a given level l. This deﬁnes a corresponding effort by
G.l;e.P;l// D 1 ¡ P. Then our condition amounts to the concavity of e.P;l/ in l: if the
agent is able to accept higher losses, then he can only reduce effort at a decreasing rate.SHOULD RISK-AVERSE AGENTS EXERT MORE EFFORT? 27
5. A simple proof of the single-crossing condition
The proof is based on the following lemma, which is of more general range of applicability
(a similar result appears in Meyer [1977], Theorems 1 and 2):
Lemma 7: Consider an agent endowed with a VNM function U; nondecreasing; facing
twowealthdistributionswithcdfs F1.w/and F2.w/. Denote±.w/ D F1.w/¡F2.w/. Then
the following properties are equivalent:
(i) If U prefers F2 to F1; then so does any V more risk averse than UI
(ii) If
R
U0.w/±.w/dw ¸ 0; then for all w0 :
R w0 U0.w/±.w/dw ¸ 0.
Proof. Suppose (i) holds and
R
U0.w/±.w/dw¸0. Integrating by parts, one gets R
U.w/dF1.w/·
R
U.w/dF2.w/, so that U prefers F2 to F1.F o rag i v e nw0, de-
note V.w/D min.U.w/;U.w0//. V is more risk-averse than U, so that from (i) we get R
V 0.w/±.w/dw ¸ 0, or equivalently
R w0 U0.w/±.w/dw ¸ 0. This shows (ii).
Reciprocally, suppose that U prefers F2 to F1. Then
R
U0.w/±.w/dw ¸ 0. Suppose
that (ii) holds. If V is more risk-averse than U, then there exists a concave nondecreasing















where N w is an upper bound of the support of the wealth for both distributions. This is
nonnegative, from (ii) and the concavity of k. Therefore, V prefers F2 to F1, and (i) holds.
2
We can now prove the sufﬁciency of single-crossing condition. Denote by eu the optimal
choice of effort for U, assuming it is unique. For e < eu, suppose that ±.w/ D F.w;e/ ¡
F.w;eu/ is nonnegative, then nonpositive. Deﬁne u.w/ D
R w U0.s/±.s/ds. We know that
u.¡1/ D 0,andthatu isnondecreasing,thennonincreasing,whenwincreases. Moreover,
u.C1/ ¸ 0 since U prefers eu to e. Therefore u is nonnegative everywhere. This proves
(ii) in Lemma 7, which is equivalent to (i). From (i) any more risk-averse V prefers eu to
all e < eu, so that his optimal choice of effort cannot be smaller than eu.
If U has multiple optimal choices, take eu to be the largest optimal choice for U. Then
any optimal choice for V that is not an optimal choice for U is larger than eu.5
The fact that the condition is a minimal condition, follows from the fact that if ±.w/
changes sign from negative to positive, it is possible to ﬁnd a nonnegative function U0.w/
such that (ii) is violated.28 BRUNO JULLIEN, BERNARD SALANI´ E AND FRANC ¸OIS SALANI´ E
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Notes
1. This last condition is necessary for the existence of an interior optimal level of effort.
2. See also Athey [1997].
3. The proof of concavity is omitted: simply write the second-order condition and use the ﬁrst-order condition.
4. A related but stronger condition, referred to as a simple risk-reducing deterministic transformation, appears
in Dionne and Gollier [1992] and Meyer [1992], where it is used for different purposes.
5. We only assume that V is more risk averse, so that U0.w/ ¡ V 0.w/ may cancel on some range. It is thus
possible that an optimal choice for V coincides with a smaller optimal choice of U, then eu is also optimal for
V and ±.w/evaluated between the two optimal choices cancels on the range where V 0 differs from U0.
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